We study a continuous-time principal-agent model with endogenous cash-flow volatility. The principal supplies the agent with capital for productive use, but the agent can misallocate capital for private benefit and has private control over both project volatility and investment size. The optimal contract can yield either overly-risky or overly-prudent project selection. It can be implemented with a static two-part tariff on capital (fixed cost plus hurdle rate) while giving the agent control over the quantities of capital, risk, and equity share. Our model captures stylized facts about the use of hurdle rates and capital charges in practice.
Introduction
Organizational settings in which project managers privately influence both the amount and riskiness of investment are ubiquitous. A manager may privately allocate capital across projects with different cash flow volatilities, or simultaneously discover and exploit opportunities with different risks. Nevertheless, the design of dynamic incentive plans that both allocate the appropriate amount of capital and induce managers to take the desired amount of volatility has challenged formal analysis.
In this paper, we build a continuous-time dynamic contracting model in which the agent has control over the size (capital allocated) and the risk (cash flow volatility per unit of capital) of assets owned by the principal. By introducing separately controlled components of cash flow, we create a framework rich enough to capture meaningful risk choices. We derive the optimal contract, describe its properties, and show that it can be implemented with a simple mechanism. The principal offers the agent two-part tariff (fixed cost and unit cost), and the agent determines the amount of capital to manage, the aggregate cash flow risk, and his pay-for-performance sensitivity. Importantly, the implementation is static: the principal does not need to dynamically control any stochastic processes nor keep track of the agent's performance history. Further, we rationalize existing capital charges and preferred returns, as well as stylized facts in capital budgeting such as a zero price of risk in hurdles rates.
We begin with a basic dynamic moral hazard framework in which the principal (she) has assets or projects that she hires the agent (he) to manage. The agent takes hidden actions that determine the cash flow from these projects; the principal observes output and rewards the agent with consumption after high output and imposes termination after low output. Separation is costly, which makes the principal effectively risk averse. Our novel assumption is that the agent receives capital from the principal but privately decides both the risk of the project and the amount of capital that is actually invested. Any remaining capital is allocated to generate private benefits for the agent.
1 The capital at issue is liquid, and can be re-allocated freely. This joint modeling of capital intensity and risk circumvents the issue that volatility is observable for Brownian motions, which has been the primary obstacle precluding the analysis of dynamic risk choice in a tractable framework. Thus, in our setting the principal must provide incentives to generate both the desired risk choice and the desired capital intensity to avoid asset misallocation. The agent's choice is constrained by the observability of total risk/volatility -it is the components of risk/volatility that are unobservable and subject to agency manipulation. We show that the resulting optimal contract can lead to both overly-risky or overlyprudent risk choice, relative to the first-best. This contrasts with the standard result under full observability (see e.g. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or Biais et al. (2007) ) that an effectively risk-averse principal would strictly prefer lower volatility. To reduce the likelihood of costly separation following poor performance, the optimal contract reduces the volatility of the agent's continuation value, which has two components: the volatility of the project's cash flow, and the agent's exposure to it (his pay-performance sensitivity, or PPS). Exactly which component the principal reduces depends on the specific risk-return relationship, and most critically, on how much additional risk the agent takes as incentives are made less intense. When the risk taken by the agent is very sensitive to incentives, the principal offers more incentives, increasing PPS and reducing risk below the first-best level. In contrast, when the risk taken by the agent is relatively insensitive to incentives, the principal relaxes incentives, reducing PPS and resulting in overly-risky project choice. In contrast to the risk adjustment, capital intensity is always (weakly) less than the first-best because more intensive use of capital implies higher cash-flow volatility and requires higher pay-performance sensitivity.
We also demonstrate a generic and simple implementation for the optimal contract. In a standard recursive optimal contract, the principal would allocate capital to the agent and command a certain level of total cash flow risk. Our implementation allows the agent to choose his own quantity of capital, the cash-flow risk target, and even his own compensation structure (his PPS or equity share). The principal simply supplies the requested capital to the agent at a cost that based on the agent's announced choices.
2 The cost of capital (or, capital charge) is subtracted from the project's output, and the remainder is split between the principal and agent based on the proposed equity share. There are two critical points regarding the implementation. The first is that the implementation is static: the principal does not need to make any dynamic adjustment to the formula used to calculate the cost of capital, and she does not need to track the agent's performance history either. In other words, the time-varying policies of the optimal dynamic contract can be automatically carried out by offering the agent a static formula for a fixed fee and hurdle rate. The second point is that the mechanism we use to make the implementation static is somewhat generic. We augment the cash flow process to include a capital charge so that the agent chooses the quantities that were principal's controls (e.g. PPS) in the optimal contract. The mechanism works because the agent is indifferent across incentive compatible contracts that meet the participation constraint, and the two-part tariff (capital charge) formula is calculated to maintain the indifference across the set of the agent's choices. Then, the agent picks the principal's desired controls.
Our implementation rationalizes several observed practices of capital budgeting. As documented by Jagannathan et al. (2016) , Graham and Harvey (2001) , and others:
3 firms impose capital rationing on managers through a deliberately high price of capital (hurdle rate) and that they most commonly do not adjust that cost of capital for risk. These stylized facts contradict conventional wisdom and textbook corporate finance instruction. In our model, the principal optimally imposes a high cost of capital to limit the scale of the agent's investment and the size of the agency problem, passing up otherwise positive NPV projects. More surprisingly, our implementation rationalizes the practice of not adjusting for project risk when determining costs of capital. We obtain this result because the agent's incentive compatibility condition equalizes the marginal product of capital in productive and unproductive projects. Thus, the cost of capital can be set equal to the marginal product of capital in unproductive projects, without adjusting for the returns and risk in the productive projects, and the desired capital allocation follows. In addition, as a matter of contract form, our cost of capital (hurdle rate) can be interpreted as a preferred return to investors. These returns are standard in private equity contracts (see e.g. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) or Robinson and Sensoy (2013) ). Alternatively, the hurdle rate can be interpreted as a type of Funding Value Adjustment or a Capital Value adjustment, as described in Andersen et al. (2018) . In these arrangements, a previously decided cost of capital is deducted from the profit and loss statement of an operation before gains are distributed.
4 Our model provides a fairly simple and generic benchmark to demonstrate and predict differences in the cross-section and the time-series of the cost of capital as well as the relationship between managerial risk-taking and pay-for-performance.
Finally, our results help reconcile empirical evidence regarding the correlation between investment risk and pay-performance sensitivity, which has been particularly ambiguous among existing studies.
5 Our model points out that there are actually two different mechanisms through which incentives are determined. The first is a "static" mechanism, which is described by the agent's incentive compatibility constraint, capturing the causal trade-off between incentives and risk. The second is a "dynamic" mechanism, which corresponds to the solution to the principal's maximization problem, where risk, size and PPS jointly evolve according to the agent's performance. Empirically, this means that the causal relationship between risk and PPS could be very different from their time-series correlations, which helps explain why existing studies failed to conclusively demonstrate how risk and PPS correlate with each other. The basic framework of our model borrows from DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al. (2007) . Two other studies that examine volatility control in continuous-time are Cvitanić et al. (2016b) and Leung (2017) . Cvitanić et al. (2016b) (and Cvitanić et al. (2016a) ) assess optimal control over a multi-dimensional Brownian motion when the contract includes only a terminal payment and is sufficiently integrable. They show the principal can attain her optimal value (possibly in a limit) by maximizing over contracts that depend only on output and quadratic variation. The setup is similar to earlier work by Cadenillas et al. (2004) and more broadly the literature on delegated portfolio control such as Carpenter (2000) , OuYang (2003) and Lioui and Poncet (2013) , which focus on exogenous compensation and/or information structures. Another contemporaneous work involving volatility control is Leung (2017) , who, like us, assumes that cash flow is made of two components: agent's private choice of project risk and an exogenous market factor that is unobservable to the principal. However, because the market factor in Leung (2017) is exogenous, after the contract is in place, the agent has only limited ability to manipulate risk without being detected. Our paper is also broadly related to Biais et al. (2010) , DeMarzo et al. (2013) , Li and Williams (2017) , and others what study optimal incentives when the agent's action generate discrete, verifiable jump risks. Finally, Epstein and Ji (2013) develop a volatility control model based on an ambiguity problem. In contrast, with standard preferences, we study the design of an optimal contract in an intuitive agency environment and show that our contract can be implemented with a simple structure largely resembling the practice of capital budgeting. 
Model
In this section, we describe a principal-agent problem in which an agent is hired by a principal to manage an investment. The principal gives capital to the agent, and the agent privately allocates that capital among different projects or uses. The principal designs an incentive contract based on total output to induce the agent to choose the desired projects -the desired sources of cash flow and volatility.
The Basic Environment
There is a principal that has access to capital and an agent that has the skills to manage profitable projects. Both the principal and the agent are risk neutral. Time is continuous. The principal has unlimited liability, the ability to cover project costs, and a discount rate r, which is also her flow cost (rental rate) of liquid working capital. The agent has limited liability, no ability to access capital on his own, 7 and a discount rate γ > r. The principal has outside option L > 0, and the agent has outside option R = 0. 8 The agent cannot borrow or save. A contract allows the principal to fund the agent's projects so that they share the surplus created. The agent manages a set of projects indexed by volatility σ, with 0 ≤ σ ≤ σ ≤ σ. Given a level of volatility and of liquid, working capital capital K t ≥ 0, the agent's project choice generates a cumulative cash flow Y t that evolves as
where Z t is a standard Brownian motion. µ(σ) represents the return to the agent's most efficient use of capital given a particular level of volatility. Both σ t and K t can be instantaneously adjusted without cost; K t represents liquid working capital, such as cash, machine-hours, etc. The cash flow process represents the agent's most efficient return for a given level of volatility from a limited selection of projects based on real assets. Because the agent has a limited selection of underlying projects, each additional unit of capital is invested with DeMarzo et al. (2012), and Malenko (2018) . We add to those papers by modeling an agency problem over capital intensity and the productivity of capital, as opposed to over mean cash flow or growth.
less cash flow output. We capture this with a decreasing-returns-to-scale technology:
is three-times differentiable with
Because the agent's projects are based on real assets, as opposed to financial assets, they cannot profitable sustain infinite volatility. Instead, some risk taking is efficient, but beyond a certain point increasing volatility reduces average cash flows. We capture this with a hump-shaped returns technology: µ (σ) < 0, µ(σ) attains its maximum inside (σ, σ), and µ(σ) < 0.
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Our specification is flexible and allows a well-defined, interior first-best capital and volatility of investment {K F B , σ F B }, which are given by
and characterized by the first-order conditions 0 = µ (σ F B ) and r = f (K F B )µ(σ F B ).
The Agency Friction
The principal supplies capital K t to the agent and a recommended level of project volatility σ t . The agent chooses two hidden actions. First, the agent can allocate the capital to productive projects or to an unproductive project that generates private benefits. The actual amount allocated in productive projects isK t and is used to generate dY t . The remaining capital, K t −K t , is allocated to a zero-cash-flow project that generates a flow of private benefits λ(K t −K t )dt. Capital misallocation is (weakly) inefficient: capital cannot be used to generate private benefits in excess of its rental cost: 0 < λ ≤ r. 11 The principal's incentive compatibility problem is to create a contract that induces the agent to allocate 9 Allowing concavity in the production function can be more realistic than linearity (e.g. allowing for organizational frictions like a limited span of control), and the assumption generates a first-best with finite capital usage. Because our principal and agent are risk-neutral, the first-best will be achieved after some histories (see Section 3). In contrast, a linear production function (e.g. f (K) = K) implies infinite first-best capital usage. To compensate, one would need to make the agent risk averse, as in Sannikov (2008) . Risk aversion can generate a principal's value function that is strictly concave, so that the first-best level of capital is never implemented. However, the fundamental agency problem remains unchanged, and the comparative statics in Section 3 and the implementation in Section 4 remain substantively similar.
10 For example, if the agent is choosing among underlying projects each with a normally distributed returns and a linear cost of volatility, then we have µ(σ) = µ + C σ 2 − σ 2 − bσ. If instead the agent faces a constant return to risk minus a convex volatility penalty, then we may have µ(σ) = bσ − σ α .
11 In Section 6 and the Appendix, we present and discuss several model extensions. One has the private benefits project generating cash flow volatility; a second allows a general, non-linear flow of private benefits; a third allows for efficient private benefits. capital according to the principal's recommendation.
Our agency problem can be interpreted in several different ways:
• ChoosingK t < K t simply means shifting capital to enjoyable but unproductive projects. Thus, a manager with a desire for the quiet life (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) ), or a manager who prefers not to travel to make site inspections (e.g. Giroud (2013)) would both qualify.
• In Section 4, we demonstrate an implementation of the optimal contract that allows the agent to request any amount of capital (K) from the principal and allocate some of it (K t < K t ) to unproductive projects. In that case, the agency friction can also be naturally interpreted as empire-building, since the manager enjoys the control of more capital than it is needed for productive uses.
• A manager might not want to spend the effort to maintain all possible opportunities. For example, a manager might watch a smaller number of potential investments. In doing so, he gains private benefits from shirking λ∆ t , and the efficient investment frontier is reduced to f (K − ∆ t ) (µ(σ t )dt +σ t dZ t ). Here, ∆ t plays the role of
The cash-flow process Y is observable to the principal. Given the continuous nature of the shocks (dZ t ), the principal can infer the true overall volatility.
12 As a result, the principal can impose a particular level of overall volatility (e.g. by terminating the agent if the proper level is not observed). We make the more direct assumption that the principal simply controls the total cash-flow volatility from (1), labeled Σ t , with
The second equality is the constraint that the agent must achieve the desired level of total volatility with his hidden choices. The agency friction in our model comes from the fact that the principal does not observe the source of volatility -intensive capital use in productive projects or excessively risky projects. Put differently, the agent can generate the appearance of productive activity (cash flow volatility) while still putting capital to use generating private benefits. The agent can 12 For concreteness, consider a heuristic example: a principal observes dX t = a t dt + b t dZ t with X 0 known and b t > 0, but the principal does not observe either a t or b t directly. The ability to observe the path of X implies the ability to observe the path of
t dt, the principal is able to infer b t along the path. allocate K t −K t capital to the unproductive project while increasing the volatility in the productive project (σ > σ t ), keeping aggregate volatility (Σ t ) constant. In so doing, the agent enjoys total private benefits λ(K t −K t ). Thus, the principal provides an incentive contract to induce the agent to choose the desired components of volatility; the agent must be induced not to take bad risks that hide bad asset allocation.
Remark 1 Existing models of hidden-risk taking generally focus on jump risk. One class of models links increased jump risk to private benefits, such as Biais et al. (2010) and Feng (2018) . These models share the feature that stronger (down-side) incentives reduce jump risk and shirking. A second class of models links increased jump risk to extra returns, such as DeMarzo et al. (2013) , Moreno-Bromberg and Roger (2016) , Williams (2017), and Wong (2017) . These models share the feature that stronger pay-for-performance incentives encourage jump-risk, and, if there is an additional effort process, lower private benefits from shirking. The principal then imposes a second set of incentives to reduce jump risk. Our model works differently than those just mentioned because we consider a moral hazard problem over the components of volatility. Excess volatility is linked to private benefits at the project level, despite the fact that private benefits have no direct effect on cash-flow volatility. Instead, the effect is indirect: the agent allocates capital to the unproductive project and compensates with an excessively volatile productive project choice. Despite the direct/indirect distinction, our model has a positive association between undesirable risk taking and obtaining private benefits, so it also has the property that stronger incentives reduce project volatility (see Section 3.1).
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Objective Functions
Contracts in our model are characterized using the agent's continuation utility as the state variable. Denote the probability space as (Ω, F, P ), and the filtration as {F t } t≥0 generated by the cash-flow history {Y t } t≥0 . Contingent on the filtration, a contract specifies a payment process {C t } t≥0 to the agent, a stopping time τ when the contract is terminated, a sequence of capital {K t } t≥0 under the agent's management, and a sequence of recommended volatility levels {σ t } t≥0 . {C t } t≥0 is non-decreasing because the agent is protected by limited liability. All quantities are assumed to be integrable and measurable under the usual conditions. 13 In the Appendix, we extend the model so that the private benefits project also generates volatility. In this version, using capital for private benefits forces the agent to reduce productive volatility, meaning private benefits are associated with insufficient productive risk taking. The principal thus uses stronger incentives to induce the agent to take more risk.
Given a contract, the agent chooses a given set of policy rules {K t ,σ t } t≥0 . The agent's objective function is the expected discounted value of consumption plus private benefits
while the principal's objective function is the expected discounted value of the cash flow, minus the rental cost of capital and payments to the agent
where both expectations are taken under the probability measure associated with the agent's choices. The optimal contract is defined as:
Definition 1 (Incentive Compatible and Optimal Contracts) A contract is incentive compatible if the agent maximizes his objective function by choosing
A contract is optimal if it maximizes the principal's objective function over the set of contracts that 1) are incentive compatible, 2) grant the agent his initial level of utility W 0 , and 3) give W
This definition restricts our analysis to contracts that involve no capital misallocation because we have defined incentive compatible contracts to meanK t = K t . In developing the optimal contract in Section 3, we will restrict attention to contracts that implement zero misallocation. This is without loss of generality as long as misallocation is inefficient (λ ≤ r), which we show in Proposition 3. We discuss generalizations to λ > r in Section 6.
The Optimal Contract
In this section we derive the optimal contract. We begin by characterizing the properties of incentive compatible contracts and then proceed to the principal's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation. We end with a categorization of contract types and some comparative statics. Our discussion in the text will be somewhat heuristic; proofs not immediately given in the text are in the Appendix.
Continuation Value and Incentive Compatibility
The following proposition summarizes the dynamics of the agent's continuation value W t as well as the incentive compatibility condition:
Proposition 1 Given any contract and any sequence of the agent's choices, there exists a predictable, finite process β t (0 ≤ t ≤ τ ) such that W t evolves according to
The contract is incentive compatible if and only if
If the contract is incentive compatible, then β t ≥ 0 with
and (6) simplifies to
The dynamics of W t can be derived using standard martingale methods. The first three terms on the right hand side of (6) reflect the promise keeping constraint: because the agent has a positive discount rate, any utility not awarded today must be compensated with increased consumption in the future. The last term contains the agent's incentives, where β t is the agent's pay-performance sensitivity (PPS): for every dollar of excess cash flow, the agent's continuation value changes by β t dollars. Under an incentive compatible contract {K t ,σ t } = {K t , σ t }, so (6) simplifies to (9).
The incentive compatibility condition (7) is a maximization over the discretionary part of the agent's instantaneous payoff. Given the evolution of the agent's continuation value (6), the agent choosesK t andσ t to maximize his flow utility:
Cash flow paid to the agent
Agent's private benefit (10) subject to two constraints. First, because the agent cannot borrow on his own, he must
Second, because the principal controls aggregate volatility (3), the agent must choose his controls such that f (K t )σ t = f (K t )σ t = Σ t . The resulting maximization problem is given in (7).
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The expression for β t in (8) is the inversion of the maximization in (7): the level of pay for performance sensitivity that is necessary for the agent to choose the principal's recommended values of K t and σ t .
We now discuss the important features of incentive compatible contracts in our setting. First, the agency friction does not prevent the principal from implementing the first-best outcome. In fact, the principal can do so even without giving the agent a full share of the project's cash flow:
We define β F B ≡ λ r ≤ 1 to be the level of incentives which, when combined with
implement the first-best policies in the second-best problem.
is the ratio of the marginal benefit from capital misallocation (λ) to the marginal value of productive capital (r), which is less than one. Substituting β t = λ r into the agent's problem (7) produces the same outcome as the firstbest optimization (2). No additional incentives are needed to implement the first-best level of volatility.
Second, the agency friction requires the principal to be somewhat moderate in her risk-taking: the principal is precluded from implementing very-high or very-low volatility projects.
Property 2 The principal cannot implement very-low volatility (σ ≤ σ ≡ arg max
). It must be the case that ∂ ∂σ µ(σ) σ < 0. The principal will never implement very-high volatility (σ ≥ σ ≡ max{σ|µ(σ) = 0}).
Intuitively, the principal can never implement σ in regions where
≥ 0, because the agent always has a profitable deviation (increasingσ): since
, for any Σ t fixed by the principal, the agent can increaseσ so as to increase E [dY t ]. At the same time, increasinĝ σ also frees up capital to be used for private benefits, which implies that the agent's deviation increases both average cash flows and private benefits. Since µ(σ) is hump-shaped, it is verylow volatility projects for which ∂ ∂σ µ(σ) σ > 0, thus, those very-low volatility projects are never incentive compatible.
Further, the principal will never choose to implement a value of σ > 0 that generates negative expected cash flow. This follows from the fact that the principal can always generate zero cash flow with zero volatility by giving the agent zero capital, and the principal's value function is concave, which we show in the next Section.
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Third, for moderate volatility projects (σ t ∈ σ, σ ), stronger incentives are used to increase capital intensity and decrease volatility:
< 0 in the implementable region, stronger incentives are used to increase the efficiency of risk taking (the Sharpe ratio of cash flows).
There are two equivalent ways to understand why β σ < 0. The first is to recall that the principal can only implement levels of volatility for which the Sharpe ratio (µ(σ)/σ) is decreasing in σ. This implies that that average cash flow, conditional on total volatility,
is decreasing in σ. Thus, taking total volatility as given, higher average cash flows come about by increasing the efficiency of risk-taking.
The second way is to recall that the agent is tempted to take excessive risks to conceal his misallocation because of the total volatility constraint f (K)σ = f (K)σ. However, the marginal return to productive projects is decreasing (µ (σ) < 0), which implies there is a cash flow cost to the agent for excess risk-taking. Furthermore, the cost is convex, so the impact of excessive risk-taking on the average cash flow is lower when volatility is lower. Consequently, stronger incentives are needed to prevent the agent from excessive risk-taking when volatility is lower.
In contrast, stronger incentives are needed to implement higher capital intensity (β K > 0), because the marginal return to productive use of capital (f (K)) is decreasing, while the marginal value of capital in generating private benefits (λ) is constant. In other words, there is a shortage of good projects but no shortage of bad projects. Thus, stronger incentives are needed to induce the agent to retain capital for productive purposes when projects are already large. Agency acts to exacerbate decreasing returns to scale, as it is more difficult to prevent capital misallocation when there is a large amount of capital in place. We illustrate the solution to the agent's problem as well as the features we discussed above in Figures 1 and 2 . 
The Principal's Value Function
Given the results of Proposition 1, the principal's problem is to maximize her objective function (5), subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (7), the law of motion for W t (9), and the agent's participation constraint (W t ≥ R = 0). The agent's continuation utility W is a sufficient state variable to characterize the principal's maximal payoff under the optimal contract. Let F (W ) be the principal's expected payoff (5) for the optimal contract given the agent's continuation value. F (W ) can be fully characterized with an ODE with boundary conditions summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 A solution to the principal's problem F (W ) exists, is unique and is concave
, and has F (0) = L. {K, σ} are the optimal policies, and
. The agent's continuation utility evolves as in (9), which has a unique weak solution.
Proposition 2 is a standard dynamic programming solution. First, the principal will pay the agent only when the agent's continuation utility exceeds a given threshold, so that
This payment boundary exists because the agent is risk-neutral with respect to consumption and more impatient than the principal. W C represents the point beyond which the cost of saving for the agent (due to his impatience) exceeds the benefit of avoiding contract termination after series of negative shocks.
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Second, the principal chooses K > 0 and has F (0) = L. This means that the project is always running and that if the agent's continuation utility drops to his outside value, the contract is terminated. This is a result of our parametric assumptions: L > 0 and the agent's outside value, R = 0.
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Finally, for W ∈ R, W C , applying Ito's Lemma to dF (W ), we obtain
17 These boundary conditions are the same as those in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , in which detailed argument can be found. The principal can always make a lump-sum payment of dC to the agent, moving the agent from W to W − dC. This transfer benefits the principal only if F (W − dC) − dC ≥ F (W ), and so we have no transfers if F (W ) ≥ −1. Thus, we define W C = min{W |F (W ) ≤ −1}, and the smooth-pasting condition is F (W C ) = −1. Since W C is optimally chosen and the principal has linear utility, we have the super-contact condition F (W C ) = 0. See Dumas (1991) for a general discussion of the smooth-pasting and super-contact conditions. 18 In a more general model with R > 0, the principal may temporarily shut down the project by setting K = 0 and allowing the agent's continuation value (W ) to reflect upwards. We discuss this generalization in Section 6. Our proof of Proposition 2 shows that this temporary shutdown will only ever occur at W t = R, and only for R > 0.
Combined with cash flows, this yields the principal's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation (13). Because the principal's value function is concave, the F (W ) term is always negative, which represents the principal's cost of providing incentives to the agent. We discuss properties of the HJB equation and the dynamics of the endogenous variables K(W ), β(W ), σ(W ) and Σ(W ) in the next subsection. 
Contract Description
The optimal contract and its key comparative statics can be summarized as the following:
Proposition 3 The optimal contract has the following properties:
< 0 as the elasticity of incentives with respect to project volatility. This quantity does not depend on
5. If we generalize Definition 1 to allow for capital misallocation (private benefits) in optimal contracts, then all optimal contracts implement zero misallocation, except possibly at W C .
Proposition 3.1 can be found through direct evaluation of (13): because F (W C ) = 0, the maximization problem in (13) is the same as the first-best maximization problem (2). Intuitively, F (W ) is associated with the cost of incentive provision. The payment boundary (W C ) exists because the cost of delaying payment (the agent's impatience) exactly equals the benefit (reduced possibility that future sequence of negative shocks moves W t down to R), so the principal is effectively risk-neutral with respect to risk in the agent's continuation utility. This implies that the principal is temporarily able to implement the first-best project choice at W = W C .
Between the left and right boundaries, we have F (W ) < 0, and the cost of incentives prevents the principal from implementing the first-best project choice. From the principal's value function (13), the flow cost of incentives is
There are two useful ways of understanding the principal's choices. The first is to examine the principal's volatility controls, {Σ, β}. These give us volatility and incentive choices at the relationship level. The second is to examine the cash-flow inputs, {K, σ}. These give us capital and risk choices at the investment level. The mapping between {K, σ} and {Σ, β} is given by the formulas for Σ and β (3 and 8).
It is clear that the cost of incentives is an increasing function of β and Σ: increasing either of these processes increases the volatility of the agent's continuation value (left hand side of equation 14). As the principal becomes more effectively risk averse (F (W ) becomes more negative), the principal will reduce the volatility of the agent's continuation utility, meaning she will reduce β and Σ. The result is Proposition 3.2 A novel result of Proposition 3.3 is that the optimal contract may implement levels of project-based risk (σ) that are higher or lower than the first-best. The volatility of the agent's continuation value is not a purely increasing function of project-level risk. The reason is that σ affects the volatility of the agent's continuation value through two opposing mechanisms: on the one hand, Property 3 shows that β σ < 0. That is, implementing a larger σ (which leads to a less risk-efficient cash flow) requires weaker incentives. On the other hand, cashflow volatility is increasing in project-level volatility since Σ = f (K)σ. The volatility of the agent's continuation value is a product of these two effects, Σ σ > 0 and β σ < 0, and so whether the optimal contract implements a higher or lower σ relative to the first-best depends on which effect dominates.
The elasticity of incentives with respect to project volatility (ε β,σ ) captures the effect of σ on continuation value volatility. When ε β,σ < −1, incentives can be made much weaker for high levels of project volatility; enough weaker that total volatility of the agent's continuation volatility (βΣ) is lower for high project-level volatility. When ε β,σ > −1, incentives can be made only slightly weaker for high levels of project volatility; the dominant effect is that higher project-level volatility causes higher total continuation volatility. The critical distinction here is between cash-flow volatility and continuation-value volatility. The agency problem dictates that it is the risk of default and termination that generates losses -and therefore the agent's continuation value volatility that generates risk -but risky projects can be implemented by giving the agent a small share of those projects, and this creates low continuation-value volatility.
While capital K also affects continuation value volatility through both the incentives and project volatility channels, it does so in the same direction because Σ K and β K are both positive. More capital implies more total volatility, and stronger incentives are necessary to prevent shirking with high capital intensity because the marginal return to productive capital is lower. Thus the optimal contract always features under-investment
relative to the first-best.
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Proposition 3.4 is the time-series analog to parts 2 and 3. If a given change of W causes F (W ) to becomes more negative -the principal becomes effectively more risk averse -then she will act to reduce Σ and β, and make the corresponding change in K and σ. Thus, the instantaneous change in controls is perfectly correlated (1 or −1).
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Last but not least, we note that because misallocation is assumed to be weakly inefficient (λ ≤ r), the optimal contract is robust to considering positive capital misallocation in equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 3.5.
To summarize the results in this subsection, we illustrate an optimal contract in Figure 3 . We label solutions for ε β,σ > −1 and σ t ≤ σ F B as "Under-σ"; and solutions for ε β,σ < −1 and σ t ≥ σ F B as "Over-σ".
20 In Section 6 we extend the model and allow general, non-linear private benefit from misallocation. There, it is possible that weaker incentives are required for larger investment (e.g. β K < 0) and thus the optimal contract may reduce the volatility of the agent's continuation utility by increasing K, resulting in over-investment (K t ≥ K F B ) relative to the first-best.
21 One might wish to sign the change in controls as a function of continuation value, i.e. to write something like Σ (W ) > 0. We have been unable to prove this result or to find a counter-example in our numerical simulations. More limited results may be proved: for example, Lemma 9 can be used to show that if L is high enough, then F (W ) > 0, and Σ (W ), K (W ), β (W ) and σ (W ) may all be signed. However, F (W ) > 0 is not generically true in models built on DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) and Biais et al. (2007) . These models have the property that for some parameter values, particularly intermediate values of L, the principal may become less risk averse when close to default. Piskorski and Westerfield (2016) demonstrates how one can use additional assumptions to obtain sharper results in this class of models. 2 + σ and generates W C = 3.27. In the top row, the solid blue line is F (W ), and the dashed black line is the right-boundary condition
In the second row, the solid blue line is β(W ) and the dashed red line is Σ(W ).
Implementation
Description
In this section, we show that the optimal contract can be implemented with a simple twopart tariff on capital. The most critical features of the implementation are that the two-part tariff is a static function of the agent's visible choices, and the principal does not keep track of the agent's continuation utility. In other words, after setting up the two-part tariff, the principal's role is simply to apply the static functions.
The principal offers to rent capital to the agent as a two-part tariff:
• The fixed capital of production (the assets that have liquidation value L) is assigned a rental price φ.
• The variable capital of production, K, is assigned a unit price θ (i.e. a hurdle rate).
The agent can freely request any level of capital and cash flow volatility, and even his payfor-performance sensitivity (i.e. any combination of {K t ,Σ t ,β t }. The tilde notation is used to indicate that those quantities are choices of the agent. The tariff is adjusted based on the agent's choices: θ = θ(Σ t ,β t ) and φ = φ(Σ t ,β t ), and the cost of capital is deducted from the project's cash flows:
The agent retainsβ t dY N EW , which is placed into a cash account with balance M t that the agent controls. This account grows at interest rate γ but the agent can freely withdraw consumption from the account as long as the balance is positive. 22 That is, the account balance evolves according to:
The original agency friction remains: the agent can still privately invest only a portion of the capital given (K ≤K) into projectσ and obtain the corresponding private benefit λ(K −K), subject to the chosen volatility constraint: f (K)σ =Σ. The agent is prohibited from borrowing on this own account, so we require M t ≥ 0.
The most critical property of the implementation is that, although the equilibrium hurdle rate θ and rental cost φ are time-varying, they are static functions of the agent's choices {Σ t ,β t }. The principal does not need make any dynamic adjustment to those functions based on the agent's specific policy choices or his performance history. In fact, she does not even need to track the agent's continuation utility; the account M t performs this role. That is, W t = M t in equilibrium, despite the fact that the agent can withdraw consumption from the account at any time.
We formally summarize the implementation as follows:
Definition 2 (Implementation and Two-Part Tariff ) An implementation is a two-part tariff {φ(Σ, β), θ(Σ, β)} and an account M such that for all t ≥ 0, the agent chooses a set of actions {Σ t ,β t ,K t ,K t , dC t } to maximize his expected utility subject to (15) and (16). An optimal implementation is two-part tariff {φ(Σ, β), θ(Σ, β)} and account M that induces the agent to choose {Σ t ,β t ,K t ,K t , dC t } as in the optimal contract, with dC t = max(M t − W C , 0), and the agent quitting when M t = 0.
Our two-part tariff matches the common practice of placing a capital charge in the profitand-loss accounting for a desk or division. Sometimes this is called KVA (Capital Value Adjustment) or FVA (Funding Value Adjustment).
23 The goal is to measure the performance of a desk or division on an on-going basis, often for the purpose of determining compensation. In private equity, a similar mechanism is a preferred return to outside investors, in which outside investors capture a given return on capital and the residual is then split given a sharing rule with the general partner (see, e.g. Metrick and Yasuda (2010) or Robinson and Sensoy (2013) ). More generally, our implementation rationalizes the use of price controls, rather than quantity controls, in capital budgeting problems.
Optimality
To construct the optimal implementation, we will need the map {Σ, β} → {K, σ} consistent with the IC condition. Together, the functional forms for
(as in 8) and Σ(K, σ) = f (K)σ (as in 3) create such a map. With a slight abuse of notation, define K(Σ, β) and σ(Σ, β) as the value of K and σ given from {Σ, β} based on (8) and (3). That is, the values of K and σ are the incentive compatible values given the principal's controls. Then, we have Proposition 4 There exists an optimal implementation with the following properties:
where K(Σ,β), σ(Σ,β) jointly solvẽ
and φ = θ = ∞ if the solution to (19 and 20) does not exist.
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Moreover, in equilibrium, E[dY
The optimal implementation is the result of several intuitions about how the agency problem is constructed. First, every element of the adjusted cash flow dY N EW is observable to both the principal and the agent. Thus, the underlying moral hazard problem is the same in the implementation as in the optimal contract. Put differently, while it is usually assumed that the principal takes the agent's output from the underlying productive technology as the performance criterion, the principal can in fact look at any performance criterion that she likes. This intuition appears to be general: the principal can choose an augmented cash-flow process that induces the agent to choose the right level of capital, cash-flow volatility, and cash-flow share. In our setting, the augmentation is a capital charge. Second, the value of the capital charge is simple (β t θ = λ) exactly because the agent is already optimizing over capital usage. The agent's hidden action optimality implies that the marginal value of capital in the productive project (E [β t dY ]) will be the same as the marginal value of capital in private benefits (λ). Thus, to induce the agent to allocate capital correctly, we do not need to exactly measure the marginal value of capital in productive use; we can instead set the capital charge equal to the marginal private benefits. Thus, we havẽ β t θ = λ, which gives the agent no incentive to ask for additional capital for private benefits. If he were to misallocate capital, he would reduce E [β t dY ] by exactly the value of private benefits.
The capital charge has two additional features to note:
• The hurdle rate (unit price of capital) is always higher than the true cost of capital. The implementation has θ t = λ/β t , and the optimal contract has β t ≤ λ/r; together these imply θ t ≥ r, with equality only at W = W C . That is, the principal always sets the hurdle rate above the true cost at which she obtains capital from external markets. Instead, the cost of capital is determined by the agency problem.
• ∂θ/∂Σ = 0. In other words, the hurdle rate is adjusted for the agent's choice of cash flow share, but it is not additionally adjusted for risk. Again, this is exactly because the agent is already optimizing -the marginal product of capital in productive use must equal the marginal value of capital in private benefits, and the private value is constant. There is no additional modification for risk.
Third, the value of φ is set so as to make the agent indifferent across any pair of incentive compatible projects. Then, since the agent does not gain from deviating, he will pickβ t andΣ t consistent with the optimal contract. To generate this indifference, the principal sets the fixed fee φ(Σ,β) to extract the entire surplus that remains after the variable cost (θ) is deducted. More specially, given the agent's choices of {Σ,β}, and the value of θ that puts capital to productive use, the agent will choose {K,K,σ} so as to maximize E dY N EW (with private benefits set to zero). φ is set so that this maximum E dY N EW is achieved at zero for whatever {Σ,β} the agent chooses. Thus, the agent's expected flow utility is the same for any choice of {Σ,β}, and the agent is induced to make the principal's desired choice. In other words, the agent receives his full value from the contract in W 0 when it is signed, and the entire flow of expected producer surplus goes to the principal. Since the agent cannot do better than the principal's desired choices, the agent is induced to make the principal's desired choices. 25 This is exactly analogous to setting the agent's flow continuation utility (see e.g. (10)) equal to zero at the optimum, a property that the martingale representation theorem implies any incentive compatible contract must have. We can understand the agent's ability to choose his compensation structure -his own pay-performance sensitivityβ -through a trade-off with capital. The ability to chooseβ t is 25 To see this indifference tradeoff in more detail, imagine the agent has continuation utility W , which corresponds in the optimal contract to Σ(W ) and β(W ). Given incentive compatibility, choosing Σ(W ) and β(W ) will result in dW t = γW t dt + Σ(W )β(W )dZ t (from 9). Now, let us allow the agent to choose Σ(W ) and β(W ), associated with another value of continuation utility W . These new choices also lead to an incentive compatible capital allocation, and will result in dW t = γW t dt + Σ(W )β(W )dZ t . However, the agent is indifferent between these two outcomes because E[dZ] = 0, and so the expected change in continuation utility is the same under both choices. Further, this is not a product of risk-neutrality over consumption -the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman formulation implies that all agents are risk-neutral with respect to continuation utility. surprising because the private benefit from capital misallocation, λ, is fixed. For example, in DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) the desired pay-performance sensitivity is implemented with inside equity that is chosen so that the marginal benefit from reporting additional cash flow is equal to the marginal benefit from capital misallocation. Both are constant. However, in our implementation, θ is designed such that the agent has to trade off two different controls, β t andK t . Ifβ t is chosen to be very small, the cost of capital will be very high, and so the agent has to use the capital productively to avoid a loss of continuation value. Ifβ t is chosen to be high, then capital is cheap, but the gains to capital misallocation are lower than the agent's chosen cash-flow residual (pay-performance sensitivity). We illustrate the shape of the two-part tariff in Figure 4 . The last part of the implementation, the cash balance, is standard (e.g. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or Biais et al. (2007) ). It is a mechanism to turn the stock of promised future consumption (W ) into an explicit account (M ) from which the agent can consume. Since the account has rate of return γ, which is equal to the agent's time discount rate, the agent is indifferent between the timing of consumption (dC t versus e γs dC t+s for s ≥ 0).
Thus the agent is willing to consume as per the optimal contract. The agent will quit at M t = 0, receiving outside value 0 and matching the optimal contract, because the agent is not allowed M t < 0 and so cannot tolerate any positive volatility at that point. Finally, we have written the implementation so that the cost of variable capital (θ t ) is deducted from the project cash flow instead of the agent's continuation value or cash account (M t ). This is not required; we could deduct the cost of variable capital from the agent's account directly. The difference is whether we interpret the cost of capital as being paid by the agent or by the project. We have consistently interpreted the cost of capital as a capital charge, a preferred return on invested capital, or funding value adjustment, meaning it is paid by the project, not the agent personally. We can also take either β t or Σ t out of the agent's choice set; i.e. we have presented the most decentralized implementation by giving the agent the choice over both β t and Σ t as well as K t , but that is not required.
Empirical Discussion
Capital Budgeting and the Cost of Capital
In addition to the qualitative features of our implementation -the equivalence to a Funding Value Adjustment or a private equity preferred return discussed earlier -our implementation captures some broadly observed stylized facts surrounding the use of hurdle rates for capital budgeting:
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• Most or almost all firms use DCF methods with a hurdle rate. That hurdle rate is substantially above both the econometrician-estimated and firm-estimated cost of capital. For example, Jagannathan et al. (2016) find an average hurdle rate of 15% compared to an average cost of capital of 8%. They find that this is not likely to be caused by behavioral biases or driven by managerial exaggeration.
• Firms engage in deliberate capital rationing. This rationing is often a response to non-financial constraints; more that half of firms report that they pass up apparently positive NPV projects because of constraints on managerial time and expertise (55.3%, Jagannathan et al. (2016) ).
• Most firms (58.8%, Graham and Harvey (2001) ) do not adjust their hurdle rates based on project risk.
Our model is consistent with these results on hurdle rates and capital rationing: first and foremost, we demonstrate in Section 4 that the equilibrium hurdle rate is indeed higher than the firm's true cost of capital (i.e. θ t = λ/β t ≥ r). This is optimal because the agency problem imposes a constraint on the use of managerial time and expertise. The principal must offer the agent a portion of residual cash flow in order to induce the desired project choice and capital usage. This portion, combined with limited liability on the part of the manager, creates the possibility of termination, which entails the loss of a high NPV project. To avoid the larger loss, the principal accepts the smaller loss of reducing the scale of the agent's activity in order to lower the volatility of the agent's residual claim. Moreover, our model is consistent with firms using hurdle rates that do not vary with project risk. Again, this is exactly because the agent is already optimizing -the marginal product of capital in productive use must equal the marginal value of capital in private benefits, and the private value is constant. There is no additional modification for risk.
Risk-Taking and Pay-Performance Sensitivity
Dynamic adjustment in risk-taking (σ) can lead to overly-risky or overly-prudent investments. The source of this result is the difference between the volatility of the agent's inside value -which is what drives the principal's termination/default risk -and the volatility of the cash flow. The volatility of the agent's continuation value is the product of project cash-flow volatility and the intensity of incentives. Thus, depending on model specification, risk reduction can mean reducing project volatility or allowing project volatility to increase in order to reduce incentive intensity. One result is that actions that look like risk-shifting can actually be risk-reducing.
The dynamic risk adjustment can generate strong empirical differences between the static and dynamic responses to incentives -the time series and the cross section might look very different because of different sources of variation. Consider, for example, the static β(K, σ) function in (8): we have β σ < 0, meaning that for any given state of the world, stronger incentives cause lower project risk-taking. However, when we consider the path of incentives and risk-taking over time, the correlation between incentives and total risk (β and Σ) is always positive (see, e.g. Figure 3 and Proposition 3.4). At the same time, the correlation between incentives and project risk (β and σ) can be positive (in the 'under-σ' specification) or negative (in the 'over-σ' specification). Thus, the causal results of incentives and the dynamic correlation can have opposite signs. We illustrate this in Figure 5 , where the solid line is how the economy evolves as a function of W , and the dashed lines are the function β(K, σ) for two different values of K.
Empirically, this result means that our model predicts different results for time series and cross-sectional tests in the 'under-σ' specification, because the source of variation is different.
27 If the dominant source of variation is the history of success or failure (which changes over time), then we should see a positive relationship between the agent's share and volatility. This is movement along the dynamic curve, and may be more likely in time series variation. If the dominant source of variation is firm characteristics that are stable and not the history of success or failure, then we might see a negative relationship between the agent's share and volatility. Further, an experiment or identification that correctly uncovers the causal mechanism between the agent's share and volatility uncovers movement along the static curve, which generates a negative relationship. The 'over-σ' specification does deliver another empirical test. In settings with easily scalable investment and in which the relevant risk is agent-separation, rather than default, increasing project risk after failure should be more common. Investment funds, especially mutual funds and hedge funds, would seem to be good examples. They have no explicit risk of default, and to the extent that fund manager skill is real, the primary danger to fund value is that the high-skill manager leaves. In fact, many empirical results, (e.g. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Aragon and Nanda (2011), Huang et al. (2011) ) find increasing project risk after failure to be the case. However, those studies often attribute the increase in risk to convex incentive schemes. Our mechanism is different: increasing project risk actually decreases termination risk. A useful empirical test would be to distinguish changes in inside and outside values, and to see to what extent that difference impacts investment risk.
6 Further Discussion and Conclusion
Model Robustness
In the appendix we present and discuss several extensions to our model:
1. We generalize the outside options of the principal and the agent from L > 0 and R = 0 to the more general L ≥ 0 and R ≥ 0. The primary outcome is that the principal may choose K = 0 for some histories, meaning the firm temporarily shuts down. Thus temporary shutdown will only ever occur at W t = R, at which point the agent's continuation value reflects upward and the firm re-starts operations.
2. We allow private benefits to generate cash flow volatility, so that total volatility is
We show that if is high enough, we change the sign of ∂ ∂σ β(K, σ) so that stronger incentives are used by the principal to increase risk taking.
3. We allow the private benefits function (λ(K t −K t ) in the main model) to have an arbitrary form (Λ(K t ,K t )). This allows contracts that have over-investment (K t > K F B ) and efficient diversion (K t >K t in an optimal contract).
4. We allow for an additional effort choice by the agent. This changes the dimensionality of the agent's problem so that the principal uses two controls (β and Σ) to induce three choices by the agent (K,σ, andê). The principal can only implement a two-dimensional curve in a three dimensional space. The primary result is that the economics of the (K,σ) choice differ from that of hidden effort.
The purpose of these extensions is to demonstrate model robustness -that the agency problem over the components of volatility does not depend for its existence on the specific reduced-form assumptions we have made in our presentation.
Conclusion
Continuous-time principal-agent models have developed rapidly with applications to expanding areas of economic research. Despite the progress, almost all of the existing models involve the agent controlling the drift of the output/cash-flow process. We deviate from the literature by considering the optimal contract when the agent controls the volatility. In the model, overall cash flow is made up of two components: the individual risk of the project and capital intensity, both of which are observable only to the agent. The principal must incentivize the agent to choose the desirable level of project risk and capital intensity. Such setting represents a unique and different environment than a drift-control model such as modified versions of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or Biais et al. (2007) .
Interestingly, we find the optimal incentives can be implemented without loss of generality with a simple hurdle rate against which the agent's performance -the realized cash flowis measured. The agent is allowed to propose the amount of capital and the level of risk he wants, even his own incentive power. Moreover, the principal is freed from the need to keep track of the agent's performance. A natural direction of future research is to explore the implications for asset pricing and portfolio intermediation (e.g. Buffa et al. (2015) with an optimal contract). The hurdle rate becomes the required return of limited partners or outside investors, and the joint determination of contracts and equilibrium asset prices is a natural question to explore.
Appendix
A Model Robustness
A.1 R > 0 and Temporary Shutdown So far, we have assumed that L > 0 and R = 0, with the result that principal always chooses K > 0. If we generalize our assumptions to L ≥ 0 and R ≥ 0, the principal may choose K = 0 for some histories. This represents a temporary shutdown of the firm by the principal.
Proposition 2 becomes
Proposition 5 A solution to the principal's problem F (W ) exists, is unique and is concave on W ∈ R, W C , where
This Proposition is what we prove in the appendix. Proposition 2 is a corollary. The implementation is substantively unchanged.
The key result is that termination is optional for the principal: if the principal chooses K(W ) = 0, then the law of motion for W t (9, with Σ = 0) implies that W t reflects upwards atW . Thus, shutdown is temporary. The principal will only optimally choose K = 0 at W = R, and only when L ≤ L * , for some constant L * . The fact that the principal only chooses K = 0 at W = R arises because setting K = 0 is costly, and so the principal wishes to delay paying that cost as long as possible. There are two costs to setting K = 0. One is an opportunity cost because any time with K = 0 is time the principal might otherwise have positive expected cash flow. The second cost is that by causing W t to reflect early, the principal is causing W t to reflect upward at a level that is closer to the agent's consumption boundary, so the agent will be awarded consumption sooner.
The fact that the principal only chooses K = 0 if L is low is economically straightforward: the principal only avoids default and termination if her value in default is low. If L is high enough, the principal simply accepts default rather than pay the opportunity cost associated with K = 0. Note that because of the costs associated with termination, the principal's value function is concave regardless of whether termination occurs in equilibrium. If L > L * , there is a direct cost associated with termination as long as L is less than the discounted, firstbest cash flow. This cost makes volatility undesirable, and the principal's value function is concave. If L < L * , there is a direct cost to termination that the principal avoids in equilibrium, choosing instead to pay the opportunity cost of shutting down the project. The principal forgoes the project's cash flow, allowing the agent's continuation value to reflect upwards.
Our model's temporary shutdown is different from that of Zhu (2013) , who shows that the principal can relax incentives to either pay the agent with private benefits instead of cash or relax incentives to prevent termination/default after bad cash-flow realizations. Zhu (2013) has fixed project scale, and so when incentives are relaxed the principal cannot also restrict private benefits to the agent. This makes the principal worse off because of an inability to control the timing of private benefits separately from the timing of incentives. Further, the principal might have to shut down incentives before termination would otherwise happen (incentives can be relaxed at W > R in Zhu (2013) ) to make sure that the agent's continuation value is high enough to support both private benefits and the continued project.
While our model does feature an incentives shutdown, the mechanism is very different because the project's size is endogenous. In our model, the principal has to pay an ongoing rental cost of capital (rK t ) in order to fund the project; the amount of capital determines the project's scale and the potential private benefits available to the agent. Since paying the agent with private benefits delivers benefits that are less than the rental cost of capital (λ ≤ r), the principal will always couple zero incentives with zero project size. This prevents the agent from receiving additional negative cash-flow shocks, so the agent's continuation value drifts upward, and the project can continue. Because this shutdown is costly, the principal delays as much as possible, and our firm does not shut down until the last moment, W t = R.
A.2 Private Benefits with Volatility
We can also extend the model to consider situations in which private benefits generate cash flow volatility. In the current model, capital can be used to generate a flow of private benefits to the agent equal to λ(K t −K t )dt. We now additionally assume that these private benefits create cash flow volatility, so that
where is the cash flow volatility per unit of private benefits. The arguments of Section 3 follow, with
β(σ, K) > 0. This is interpretable: if re-allocating a unit of capital from productive to unproductive use increases volatility, then a matching reduction must be made in productive asset volatility. Incentives are used to push the other way -to encourage more volatility in the productive assets.
However, it is also the case that stronger incentives are used to produce less efficient risk-taking. Recall that µ(σ) is hump-shaped, and so
is decreasing in the relevant region (near σ F B ). If β σ > 0, then stronger incentives and high volatility are associated with a lower return-to-risk ratio.
Similarly, because β σ > 0, the arguments in Section 3.3 are sufficient to show that σ ≤ σ F B . In this case, the principal always reduces project level risk to reduce the volatility of the agent's continuation utility.
The implementation is substantively unchanged.
A.3 A General Private Benefits Function
We can also extend the model and consider general, non-linear specifications for the agent's private benefits from capital misallocation, which we currently assumed to be λ(K −K). This assumption implies that the agent derives a constant marginal benefit from capital misallocation which, combined with the decreasing returns to scale of f (K), can be interpreted as "there is a shortage of good projects but no shortage of bad projects". While constant marginal private benefit is consistent with many existing models of dynamic moral hazard problems and allows an easy verification of no-misallocation in equilibrium (as long as λ < r), relaxing such assumption not only affects little of the derivation and implementation of the optimal contract, but also expands the scope of analytical predictions generated by our model. We can still apply the argument used in deriving (8) in Property 3 to derive the incentive compatibility condition under generic private benefit. We summarize the new condition and its implication into the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Let Λ(K, K) denote the generic private benefit from capital misallocation. Assuming Λ(K, K) is twice-differentiable, the optimal incentive compatibility condition is
where ΛK(K, K) represents ΛK(K, K)|K =K . The optimal contract, following Definition 1, has the following property that is different from that described in Proposition 3:
There are two important differences brought by allowing a generic private benefit function Λ(K, K). The first is how incentive varies with project size, which is captured by:
Unlike (12), equation (23) can be either positive or negative depending on the specific functional form of Λ(K, K). In our baseline model, we assume the agent's marginal private benefit from misallocating an additional dollar of capital is constant (λ). In general, it might depend on the project size. If the marginal private benefit of misallocating each dollar declines with project size, and the decline is faster than the speed of marginal productivity (f (K)) declines, then the agent's tendency for misallocation is weaker when managing a larger project. Consequently, the required incentive for no misallocation can be lower as project size grows.
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The fact that β may decrease in K implies the second important difference: the possibility of "over-investment" in the optimal contract, or K(W ) > K F B . This is in contrast to the baseline model with linear private benefit, which only features "under-investment". The intuition is the same as that behind why the optimal contract could feature either "overlyrisky" and "overly-prudent" project choice: as W moves away from W C , the principal seeks to lower the volatility of W . Under generic, non-linear private benefit, β could be decreasing in K. If such decrease is fast enough, the principal may achieve a less volatile W with a high K and thus low β.
29 This result complements other studies featuring over-investment under the optimal contract in which other market frictions and elements are introduced on top a dynamic moral hazard problem.
30
We can extend the model further by allowing private benefit to be a function of project risk or total risk (e.g. Λ(K, K, σ) or Λ(K, K, Σ). We can also consider the case in which capital misallocation generates no return but some volatility to the cash flow, instead of no return and no volatility as currently assumed. Nevertheless, the basic agency friction and how it determines the optimal contract remains the same: the agent has the tendency to allocate capital towards activities that generate personal benefit and must take sub-optimally high risk in order to hide such behavior. The strength of the incentive required to prevent misallocation depends on the marginal private benefit of misallocation and the gain/loss of marginal return from the productive use of capital due to the increased risk. Consequently, when the principal wants to lower the degree of the agency friction by lowering the volatility of the agent's continuation utility, she may find it optimal to either decrease total cash flow volatility (lower σ and/or lower K) or decrease incentives (higher σ and/or higher 28 An example of such case is when Λ(K, K) = λ(K −K)/K, (and f (K) = K α , 0 < α < 1), which implies
One can interpret this case as the agent's private benefit depends on the fraction -instead of quantity -of capital misallocated. If one re-writes the private benefit as a result of effort (as discussed in the next subsection) then it represents the case in which the agent's effort has a multiplicative, instead of additive, effect on output.
29 In Proposition 6 we note that while g (K) > 0 is a sufficient condition for under-investment, g (K) < 0 is only necessary but not sufficient for over-investment. When g (K) < 0, the first order condition for K from the HJB equation (34) 
Nevertheless, we find numerical examples in that illustrate the existence of over-investment. K), resulting in different combinations of overly-prudent/overly-risky project choices and under/over-investment in the equilibrium.
Changing the private benefits function does not change the form of the implementation, but it does change some of the qualitative properties. For example, it will not longer be the case that θ does not depend on Σ. The existing result comes about because the productive marginal product of capital is equal to the unproductive marginal product of capital, which is constant. With a non-linear private benefits function, the cost of capital will be correspondingly non-linear.
Finally, we have been focusing on optimal contracts following Definition 1, i.e. a contract that eliminates capital misallocation in equilibrium because misallocation is inefficient. This is standard in the literature such that an incentive compatibility contract is also socially desirable. We can consider the case in which misallocation is efficient: for example when Λ(K, K) = λ(K − K), as in the baseline model, but with λ > r. However, this changes the right boundary of F (W ) in an uninteresting way. If capital used for the agent's private benefit is δ ≤ δ, the principal's HJB equation becomes
The principal would pay private benefits whenever the agent's continuation utility exceeded
(instead of the current boundary condition, F (W C ) = −1.)
A.4 Dimensionality
Our model uses two-dimensional incentives (β and Σ) to implement a two-dimensional agent's choice (K and σ). This raises a potentially interesting question: what would happen if the agent had more choices, particularly an effort choice. We have assumed that the agent implements a portfolio of projects with a particular risk-return tradeoff, but what if the agent could work to improve the tradeoff? What if the relationship between K and σ was not separable? We might assume that, instead of (1), we have
where e t is effort. The agent's private benefits function might then be B(K t −K t , e t ). In this setup, the principal then has two controls (β and Σ = ϕ(K t , σ t )) to implement a threedimensional choice by the agent. The incentive compatibility condition (7) becomes {K, σ, e} = arg max
under the constraint that Σ = ϕ(K,σ).
Because the principal only has two controls, but the agent has three choices, the set of choices the principal can actually implement is a two-dimensional curve in a threedimensional space. Depending on the functional forms of α and ϕ, this implementable set might be very far from the first-best. Informally, the principal can condition on output to provide incentives that capital be used efficiently and that total risk is as desired, but her controls are not more granular than that; adding an effort choice need not increase the size of the set of implementable actions.
A key insight of our model of volatility is that it represents a unique setting that cannot be captured by an economically reasonable hidden effort model, such as a simple variation of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) . One might think that our model could be moved in the opposite direction by giving the principal control over volatility and capital and giving the agent a hidden effort choice over drift.
31 However, this change of variables would put all the economics into the private benefits function in a completely uninterpretable way.
32 Instead, we give the agent a second choice over per-unit-of-capital volatility, give the principal a second control over total volatility, and impose economically reasonable assumptions on the production function f (K)µ(σ). These choices are structured so that equilibrium output could be obtained with positive probability under both the agent's true action and under the principal's desired action, thus allowing us to use the martingale methods of Sannikov (2008) . In sum, our model demonstrates that agency problems over the composition of volatility are possible and interesting -total cash-flow volatility (Σ), project volatility (σ), and agent's continuation value volatility (βσ) are all meaningfully different.
B Proofs and Derivations
In this appendix, we provide proofs of propositions included in the main text. We will assume only that L ≥ 0 and R ≥ 0. The restriction to L > 0 and R = 0, as discussed in the text of Section 2, is a corollary.
To reduce the level of mathematical formalism in the proofs of the following propositions, we maintain the following assumptions Assumption A.1 f (K) and µ(σ) satisfy the following assumptions in addition to those mentioned in Section 2.1:
31 That is, define dY t = f (K t )e t dt + Σ t dZ t instead of (1), and use e t = f (Kt)
as the hidden action instead ofK t . Then, the agent's private benefits function becomes B(e, K, Σ) = λ K −K(e, K, Σ) , wherê
3. There is a minimum positive amount of capital that the principal can grant the agent:
The first line ensures that decreasing returns occurs smoothly enough for the principal's problem to be strictly concave, so that there are no jumps in K t . The second ensures that the variance of the agent's continuation value is convex in the standard deviation of the project's cash flow. Altogether, these restrictions are economically innocuous and consistent with most commonly used production functions and risk-return relationships. Examples of f (K) that meets the conditions include f (K) = ln(1+K) and
; µ(σ) = bσ − σ a , a > 1; and µ(σ) = µ + C σ 2 − σ 2 − bσ, which is the mean-variance efficient frontier if the agent has access to several projects with normally distributed cash flows. In that case we assume C and µ are not too large.
The final condition simplifies the proof of the existence and uniqueness of the principal's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman ODE. The proceeding analysis is valid with or without this assumption. One should think of k 0 as being very small: e.g. the principal cannot allocate less than one penny of capital without allocating zero capital. See Piskorski and Westerfield (2016) for such a proof when the principal's control can go continuously to zero. Our assumption is a restriction on the principal rather than on the agent: incentive compatibility conditions will still be required at K = k 0 .
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
First 33 , we define the agent's total expected utility received under a contract conditional on his information at time t as:
The expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure induced by {K,σ}, such that
dt is a Martingale for all T > 0. Recall here that σ t ,σ t , K t , andK t are all bounded from below by zero and from above by positive constants, so Σ t is also bounded below by zero and above by a positive constant. Then, by the martingale representation theorem for Lévy processes, there exists a F t -predictable, integrable process β such that
Recall the agent's continuation value WK ,σ t defined in (4). We have
for t ≤ τ . Differentiating (26) and (27), we obtain
This equation also implies the evolution of promised value given in (6), and the evolution given in (9) for {K,σ} = {K, σ}.
Next, defineŨ t to be the payoff to a strategy {K,σ} that consists of following an arbitrary strategy until time t < τ and then {K, σ} thereafter, theñ
DifferentiatingŨ t and combining terms yields
where the second equality reflects a change in the probability measure from the one induced by {K, σ} to the one induced by {K,σ}. Recall here that both {K, σ} and {K,σ} must generate the same Σ, per the agent's constraints. If (7) does not hold on a set of positive measure, then the agent could chose {K,σ} such that
that is, the drift ofŨ is always nonnegative and strictly positive on a set of positive measure, which implies
, and so the strategy {K, σ} would not be optimal for the agent. If (7) does hold for the strategy {K, σ} thenŨ t is a super-martingale (under measure induced by {K,σ}) for any strategy {K,σ}, that is,
which proves that choosing {K, σ} is optimal for the agent if and only if (7) holds for the strategy {K, σ}.
Finally, incentive compatibility requires that β ≥ 0 because otherwise it is impossible for (7) to hold atK = K > 0. If K t = 0, thenK t = 0 and no deviation is possible, so the value of β t is irrelevant and we say β t = 0.
B.2 Proof of Property 3
into (7) yields a new maximization problem
Taking the first order condition of the objective function and setting it to zero yields
which implies (8). Meanwhile the second order condition of the objective function is given by
where the inequality follows from f (K) < 0 and µ (σ) < 0. Therefore, there is a unique maximum described by the first-order condition. The derivatives β K and β σ are direct calculations from (8).
B.3 Proof of Propositions 2 and 5
We prove Proposition 5, of which Proposition 2 is a corollary. We start with four preliminary results:
Lemma 7 Any solution to the principal's value function problem must have consumption awarded to the agent at W C such that W t ≤ W C , with F (W C ) = −1 and F (W C ) = 0.
These are the value matching and super-contact conditions.
Lemma 8 LetF solve (13). Assume that the boundary conditions in Lemma 7 are met at someŴ C , but ignore the boundary condition at W = R. ThenF (W ) < 0 for all W <Ŵ C on whichF is defined.
Proof. Taking the derivative (from the left or the right) of the HJB equation (13) with respect to W and using the envelope theorem yields
If F = 0 and F < 0 , then (31) implies F > 0. Moreover, from (13), F = 0 and F > 0 together imply rF > max[f (K)µ(σ) − rK], which is impossible since max[f (K)µ(σ) − rK] characterizes the solution under the first-best scenario. Therefore F = 0 and F < 0 are jointly impossible: if F = 0, then it must be that F > 0 (i.e. F can only cross zero from below). Therefore if F (Ŵ C ) = 0 for someŴ C then F < 0 for W <Ŵ C .
Lemma 9 LetF andF both solve (13) Assume that the boundary conditions in Lemma 7 are met atŴ C andW C , respectively, but ignore the boundary conditions at R. Then the following four statements are equivalent:
for all W ≤W C such thatF andF both exist.
•F (W ) <F (W ) for all W ≤W C such thatF andF both exist.
•F (W ) >F (W ) for all W ≤W C such thatF andF both exist.
The arguments in Piskorski and Westerfield (2016) , Lemma 8, are sufficient.
Lemma 10 LetF solve (13). Assume that the boundary conditions in Lemma 7 are met at someŴ C , but ignore the boundary condition at W = R. Then, if the principal chooses K(W ) = 0, the law of motion for W t (9, with Σ = 0) implies that W t reflects upward atW . The principal will optimally choose K = 0 only at W = R.
Proof. First, any solution to the ODE characterized by (13) with K(W ) = 0 for anỹ W > R can be improved by moving the K = 0 transition point to the left. The principal of optimality 34 implies that atW for which K(W ) = 0, the HJB equation must follow (13) with continuous F (W ) (the value-matching condition) and F (W ) (the smooth pasting condition). In addition, if the highestW for which K(W ) = 0 lies in the interior of W (i.e. W > R), then F (W ) must be continuous as well (the super-contact condition). Finally, there can be at most one value ofW for which a transition exists.
Our problem makes the continuity of F (W ) impossible. AtW > R for which K(W ) = 0, (13) becomes 0 = −rF (W ) + γW F (W ) (which generates an analytical solution, F (W ) = const × W r g ). Taking the derivative of the HJB equation, solving for F (W ) and substituting that back into 0 = −rF (W ) + γW F (W ) yields rF (W ) = −
bounded above by the first-best, it must be the case that F (W ) is bounded from below by a constant and this bound does not depend on k 0 . However, inspection of the first-order condition of (13) for K, remembering that σ and β are bounded, implies that F (W ) is arbitrarily negative if k 0 is arbitrarily small. This is a contradiction, so the second derivative cannot be continuous, and the transition from K = k 0 to K = 0 cannot be optimal on the interior of W . In addition, there cannot be a transition from K > k 0 to K = 0 on the interior of W . Taking the derivative of the HJB equation on either the left or right side ofW yields:
Since F and F are continuous atW we have 0 = (γ − r) F (W ) + γW F (W ) (with the derivative taken on the left-hand side). Since K(W >W ) > 0, it must be the case that lim W ↓W F (W ) = 0. In addition, concavity plus examination of the analytical solution for W <W shows lim W ↑W F (W ) > 0. This jump in F (W ) atW has the wrong sign for an optimal jump in K. Thus, there cannot be a transition from K > k 0 to K = 0 on the interior of W . We now proceed to analyze the HJB equation. 35 A necessary condition for optimality (Lemma 10) is that K ≥ k 0 on W ∈ (R, W C ], so we will consider that region first. Re-writing (13), we have
The right-hand-side can be written as the function H K,σ (W, F (W ), F (W )), which is differentiable in all of its arguments. Since K and β are bounded away from zero and infinity, H K,σ has uniformly bounded derivatives in F (W ) and F (W ), and H K,σ is Lipschitz continuous in F (W ) and F (W ). It follows that solutions to (33) exist, are C 2 and are unique and continuous is initial conditions. 36 Inspection of (33) and (31) shows that the solution is at least C 3 , rather than just C 2 on W ∈ (R, W C ). To complete our solution, we need to show that our remaining condition can be met: that for any L, either there exists a W C such that F (R; W C ) = L and K(R) > 0 or there exists a W C such that F (R; W C ) ≥ L and K(R) = 0. We need only consider K = 0 at R from Lemma 10. Lemma 9 shows that proposed solutions to (13) that obey the right boundary condition (at W C ) can be ranked by the proposed valueŴ C . ForŴ C = R, we have the highest solution with rF (R =Ŵ C ) = max [f (K)µ(σ) − rK] − γR. As we increaseŴ C , F (W ;Ŵ C ) declines for all W ; thus, lim W →R F (W ;Ŵ C ) declines asŴ C increases.
Within the set of solutions that obey the right boundary condition, we consider the subset with K(R;Ŵ C ) > 0. Label the infimum value of F (R;Ŵ C ) > 0 as L * , and the corresponding value ofŴ C as W * C . Any solution with K(R;Ŵ C ) > 0 must be better than the principal's value with K = 0 and immediate payment (flow γRdt), which is finite. Thus, L * and W * C are both finite. Because solutions are continuous in initial conditions, L * is also the maximum value of F (R;Ŵ C ) among all proposed solutions with K(R) = 0. Then, consider the proposed solution with V * C such that K(R, W * C ) = 0 and F (W ; W * C ) = L * . This solution can be implemented for any value of L: because K(R; W * C ) = 0, there is no termination and L is never realized. This solution is preferred to all other no-termination solutions by construction.
If, instead, L > L * , then the principal prefers to allow termination, with K(R) > 0. Since L is greater than the infimum value of F (R;Ŵ C ) among all proposed solutions with K(R) > 0, and solutions to the ODE are continuous in initial conditions and ordered (Lemma 9), there exists exactly one solution withŴ C < W * C such that F (R;Ŵ C ) = L. This shows existence and uniqueness of solutions to the HJB equation with a given liquidation value L: If L > L * , then K(W ) > 0 and solutions exist and are unique by the arguments given above. If L < L * , then we use the solution that generates K(R) = 0 and F (R) = L * , which exists and is unique. Standard existence and uniqueness results (see e.g. Karatzas and Shreve (1998) ), expanded to include Sticky Brownian Motions (see arguments from e.g. Harrison and Lemoine (1981) or Engelbert and Peskir (2014) ) are sufficient to show that (9) has a unique solution and that W t is a Sticky Brownian Motion near W R if K(W R ) = 0.
The proof is completed with a standard dynamic-programming verification argument. We illustrate F (W ) under various parameter choices in Figure 6 .
Corollary 11 If R = 0, then L * = 0. L > 0 implies the principal chooses K > 0 for all W , and the boundary value is F (R = 0) = L, and F (W ) is C 3 .
Proof. If R = 0 and K = 0, then dW = 0dt, and no further consumption is realized for either party. Thus, the principal chooses to obtain L if L ≥ 0, i.e. L * = 0.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Part 1: Direct substitution of the boundary conditions at W C into the principal's HJB equation (13). Parts 2 and 3: (13) can be equivalently written in the following two ways with accompanying first-order conditions: where CF (K, σ) = f (K)µ(σ) − rK, g(K) = f (K)/f (K), h(σ) = λσ/(µ(σ) − σµ (σ)). Assumption A.1 is sufficient to ensure strict concavity of the HJB equation with respect to K and σ. Signing g (K) and h (σ), remembering that F (W ) ≤ 0, and evaluating the first-order conditions directly, are sufficient to demonstrate the statement of the property with respect to K and σ. Next, we rewrite the cash flow as CF (β, Σ) = CF (K(β, Σ), σ(β, Σ)). Because the first-best has CF K (K F B , σ F B ) = CF σ (K F B , σ F B ) = 0, there is a corresponding value of (β F B , Σ F B ) which has CF K (K(β F B , Σ F B ), σ(β F B , Σ F B )) = CF σ (K(β F B , Σ F B ), σ(β F B , Σ F B )) = 0. The second order conditions for the HJB equation (35), evaluated at {β F B , Σ F B } are
where the inequalities follow from CF KK < 0 and CF σσ < 0. Because the first-best is unique, with CF β = 0 and CF Σ = 0, we also have that CF β > 0 implies β < β F B and CF Σ > 0 implies Σ < Σ F B . Combining this with the first-order conditions (35) yields the statement of the property.
Part 4:
Assume that the principal offers the agent a recommended level of capital misallocation, δ t , to go with the assigned level of capital, K t + δ t . Then the contract is incentive compatible if it implementsK t = K t andδ t = δ t . The incentive compatibility condition (7) becomes {K t , δ t , σ t } = arg max Kt+δt=Kt+δt; f (Kt)σt=f (Kt)σt
Note that the agent-controlled portion of the right-hand side is the same as in the original IC condition (7). The first order conditions imply that β t becomes
The evolution of the agent's continuation value becomes dW t = γW t dt + β t Σ t dZ t − λδ t dt − dC t .
The principal's HJB equation (13) f (K)µ(σ) − rK − rδ + (γW − λδ)F (W )
For any given choice of K, the objective function of (41) is linear in δ with coefficient −r − λF (W ). Since F (W ) ≥ −1, we have −r − λF (W ) < 0. Therefore, δ = 0 is (weakly) optimal.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the implementation in two stages. First, we solve the agent's problem conditional on an arbitrary choice (sequence) of {β,Σ}, as in Proposition 1 with a modified cash flow technology. The principal offers the agent the adjusted technology with
where we have setσ =Σ f (K) . Then, the probability measure induced by {K,σ,K} is such thatΣ
is an an F t -martingale (following the construction in Proposition 1). The incentive compatibility arguments in Proposition 1 also follow, with the modification that the agent's incentive compatibility condition is
Plugging in θ = λ βt (from 17) yields
which is identical to (7), withβ replacing β and f (K)σ =Σ as the constraint. Consequently, the first-order condition is necessary and sufficient and yields the solution analogous to (8).
That is,K t = K(β t ,Σ t ) which solves
Further, the maximization condition does not depend onK, so the agent is indifferent across choices ofK t ≥K t , while preferring anyK t ≥K t to anyK t <K t . Thus, we can set K t =K t = K(β t ,Σ t ). Following Proposition 7, The agent's continuation utility evolves as in (9). Second, we solve for the agent's optimal choice of {β,Σ} given (45). SubstitutingK = K = K(Σ,β) back into (42) we obtain dỸ N EW t = f (K(Σ,β))µ Σ t f (K(Σ,β)) dt − K(Σ,β)θ(β t ,Σ t )dt − φ(β t ,Σ t )dt +Σ t dZ t . (46) Further substituting in (17) and (18), (46) DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or Biais et al. (2007) ) imply that this is sufficient for W t = M t , dC t = max(M t − W C , 0), and the agent to quit at M t = 0. Because the agent's continuation value is W t = M t for any arbitrary choice (sequence) of {β,Σ}, the agent is indifferent 37 , and the agent can choose the principal's desired level of {β,Σ}.
